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Abstract 
The adaptation to situations of sequential choice 
under uncertainty of decision criteria which 
deviate from (subjective) expected utility raises the 
problem of ensuring the selection of a non­
dominated strategy. In particular, when following 
the suggestion of Machina and McClennen of 
giving up separability (also known as 
consequentialism), which requires the choice of a 
substrategy in a subtree to depend only on data 
relevant to that subtree, one must renounce to the 
use of dynamic programming, since Bellman's 
principle is no longer valid. An interpretation of 
McClennen's resolute choice, based on 
cooperation between the successive Selves of the 
decision maker, is proposed. Implementations of 
resolute choice which prevent Money Pumps, 
neg�tive prices ?f information or, more generally, 
chmces of domtnated strategies, while remaining 
computationally tractable, are proposed. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
From the point of view of decision aiding in dynamic 
choice situations, subjective expected utility (SEU) 
theory possesses two appealing features: (i) it guarantees 
rational choices, in the sense that a SEU maximizing 
decision maker (DM) is immune to the manipulations 
known as Dutch Books or Money Pumps, never displays 
any aversion to information and, more generally always 
selects a "non-dominated" strategy); (ii) optimal 
strategies can be determined by backward induction (i.e., 
by "rolling back" the decision tree) due to the validity of 
Bellman's principle of dynamic programming. 
The use of SEU theory requires the assessment of two 
characteristics: (i) the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) 
utility function of the DM on the consequences, and (ii) 
his subjective probability distribution on the events. 
Standard utility and probability assessment methods exist. 
They may not work satisfactorily, and yield incoherent 
evaluations, for the following reason: while SEU theory is 
normatively irreproachable, it performs extremely poorly 
as a descriptive model, as repeatedly shown by numerous 
experiments (Camerer and Weber 1992).Thus choices 
made by the DM are likely to exhibit patterns which 
cannot be accounted for by the model and make any 
probability or utility assesment questionable. 
One way out of this difficulty is to try and identify 
"biases" of the DM w.r.t. SEU theory and modelize a "de­
biased" behaviour. Indeed, decision aiding consists in 
part in helping the DM to avoid irrational choices based 
on psychological as well as on perceptual 
misrepresentations. However the DM may feel strongly 
for his spontaneous judgments, and thus be reluctant to 
abide by the decisions prescribed by the model. 
Another way out, which has been largely explored during 
the last decade, is to tum to different, more flexible 
decision models, which in particular are consistent with 
the most robust choice biases. Some of these models use a 
probabilistic representation, but evaluate decisions 
according to criteria which are no longer linear in 
probabilities. Some other have recourse to non­
probabilistic representations of uncertainty, such as 
upper/lower probabilities, belief functions and 
possibility /necessity functions. 
However models departing from SEU raise new 
difficulties. Even if the DM keeps the same criterion 
throughout time (and just updates his probabilities, 
beliefs, etc ... when receiving information) his preference 
pattern is no longer dynamically consistent, in the sense 
that future decisions judged optimal now may no longer 
be still considered to be so when future comes. As a 
consequence, if dynamic programming is nonetheless 
used to select a strategy (game theory has strong 
arguments in favor of that solution), the strategy chosen 
may well be dominated, i.e., there may exist another 
feasible strategy yielding a better consequence, whatever 
events occur. 
Since there is no such difficulty with one-shot decision 
problems, why not transform dynamic decision problems 
into static ones, by choosing at the initial period a 
strategy which is judged optimal at the moment, and 
never revising it later ? This solution has the obvious 
drawback of requiring the direct comparison of all 
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feasible strategies and may be computationally intractable 
even in medium-size decision problems. Moreover, the 
question of its psychological feasibility arises, since it 
requires the DM to abide at later periods by decisions he 
may no longer consider optimal. 
However, other forms of collaboration between the 
successive Selves of the DM beside the dictatorship of the 
initial Self can be contemplated. Following (McClennen 
1990) we call resolute choice the accomplishment of any 
such collaboration process. Decision aiding, requires 
explicit methods for implementing resolute choice 
solutions. Tractability considerations show that it would 
prove difficult to dispense with the advantages of dynamic 
programming ; on the other hand, the attainment of 
resolute choices implies the interdependence of all local 
choices, hence the presence of nonseparability making 
Bellman's principle invalid. We shall see that it is in fact 
possible to get round this apparent contradiction. 
2 SEU THEORY AND THE NEED FOR 
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES 
2.1 SEU THEORY 
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory evaluates a 
decision d giving gain Ci if event Ai obtains by 
n 
U(d) = I P(Ai) u(q) , (1) 
i=l 
where probability P, defined on the set of events, and 
utility u(.), defined on the set of consequences (gains), are 
subjective, i.e., depend on the DM. 
2.2 ITS F AILURE TO EXPL AIN THE 
ELLSBERG EXPERIMENT 
An urn contains 90 balls, out of which 30 are R(ed) and 
60 are B(lack) or Y(ellow). A ball is to be drawn at 
random and the subjects are asked about their choice when 
facing alternatives dR and dB and when facing dRuY and 
dBuY (see Table 1). 
ball R 
dR 100 
dB 0 
dRuY 100 
dBuY 0 
Table 1 
B 
0 
100 
0 
100 
y 
0 
0 
100 
100 
Ells berg has observed the predominant choice pattern : dR 
(against dB); dBuY (against dRuY). These choices are 
not explainable by SEU (nor, in fact by any theory 
involving subjective probabilities) since they would imply 
P(R) > P(B) and P(Ru Y) < P(Bu Y), in contradiction 
with additivity. 
On the other hand, this choice pattern can be accounted for 
by the Schmeidler (198 9) model, in which non-additive 
weights ponder the utilities in relation with their ranking ; 
more precisely, a decision d, which gives a gain Ci if event 
Ai obtains, with indices i = 1, ... ,n chosen such that Ci � 
Ci+ 1 , has value 
n n 
V(d) = u(q) + In <UA) [u(Ci)- u(ci-I)l. (2) 
i=2 j=i 
V is called a Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) criterion. 
Mathematically speaking, II is a capacity and the right 
handside of (2) is a Choquet integral. 
The observed choices are consistent with II(R) > II(B) 
and II(RuB) < II(Bu Y), which can be explained 
psychologically by ambiguity aversion : a gain on Y, 
with an ambiguous probability located in [0,2/3] is less 
attractive than the same gain with probability 1/3 ; 
similarly, a gain on Ru Y. with probability in [1/3,1], is 
less attractive than the probability 2/3 gain on BuY. 
Thus CEU is an interesting generalization of SEU from 
the descriptive point of view since it can take into account 
subjects' attitude with respect to ambiguity as well as 
other psychological traits such as the certainty effect 
(Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979). There is clearly a price 
to pay for this flexibility from the prescriptive (decision 
aiding) point of view, since the evaluation of II, a non­
additive set function, is likely to require a much greater 
effort than the evaluation of a probability (which is 
completely determined by its values on singletons). 
Nonetheless, the balance would generally be considered to 
turn in favor of the use of CEU theory rather than of SEU 
theory were it not for the appearance of serious problems 
in trying to extend the use of CEU theory or other "non 
EU" models to dynamic decision making situations. The 
seminal paper on dynamic choice is (Hammond 198 8 )  . 
3 DYNAMIC DECISION MAKING AND 
SOME BASIC CONCEPTS 
As opposed to static (one-shot) decision problems, 
dynamic decision problems are concerned with multiple, 
sequential and conditional, decisions. Such a problem is 
conveniently represented (in the finite case) by a decision 
tree, in which the DM's task is to choose a strategy (also 
called a plan), i.e., a sequence of conditional decisions. 
Given a strategy and the true elementary event, the root-to­
leaf path describing the succession of decisions taken and 
events observed is completely determined, and so is the 
gain. Thus, a strategy defines a mapping elementary event 
� gain , which can be evaluated by the DM's criterion , 
say, a CEU criterion ; moreover, a substrategy, i.e., the 
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trace of a strategy on the subtree rooted at some decision 
node, defines a similar mapping (restricted to the 
elementary events consistent with the information) and can 
also be evaluated by the DM's local criterion (which may, 
or may not, be the same CEU criterion). An optimal 
substrategy at a decision node is a substrategy which has 
the highest value among all feasible substrategies at that 
node. 
Note that at any decision node the DM is only able to 
enforce the first decision of any strategy he might 
contemplate : the following decisions will be taken by his 
future Selves. When, unlike the myopic DM in (Strotz 
1956), is aware of this fact, he will make a distinction 
between feasible and available substrategies. In particular, 
a straightforward approach (but by no means the only one) 
for solving a dynamic problem consists in using backward 
induction and progressively evaluating the still available 
substrategies at the various decision nodes. Let us try this 
solution on an example (derived from the Ellsberg 
experiment). 
R 100 
BuY 0 
B 100+2£ 
RuY 2£ 
R 100 
BuY 0 
y 100+ 2£ 
RuB 2£ 
B 100+£ H 
RuY £ 
D{owu) y 100+£ 
T RuB £ 
Figure 1 
Example 1 
Consider again an Ellsberg urn, and events R(ed), B(lack) 
and Y(ellow), and moreover a coin and equiprobable events 
H(eads) and T(ails). Event(HnB)u(Tn Y) has probability 
1/3. Figure 1 displays the decision problem. Suppose that 
the DM is a CEU maximizer, with TI(R) = 1/3 > TI(B) = 
TI(Y) and u = Id. 
Let Vi be his criterion at node i .  At node 1, V1(dR) = 
100 TI(R) and V 1 (d'B) = 2e + 100 TI(B), hence, for e> 0 
small enough, ·dR is chosen; for the same e, V2(dR) > 
V2(d'y) and dR is also chosen at node 2. 
Using backward induction, the DM then compares at node 
0 strategies (U,dR if H, dR if T) and D and prefers the 
latter since 
V0(U,dR if H, dR if T) = 100/3 < e + 100/3 = 
e + 100 TI((H n B) u (T n Y)) . 
Thus D is finally chosen, despite the fact that there exists 
a feasible strategy (U,d'B if H, d'y if T) which (strictly ) 
dominates it, i.e., would bring to the DM a gain superior 
by e to the gain offered by D, whatever happens. • 
The recursive construction of one's strategy by 
anticipating ones' future choices is known as 
sophisticated choice (Strotz, 1956). The preceding 
example shows that, when combined with CEU 
maximization at the various decision nodes, a 
sophisticated DM can end up chosing a dominated 
strategy. 
This example clearly exploits the following fact:whereas 
the most appealing strategy for the DM at node 0 is 
(U ,d 'B if H, d'y if T) he considers it as de facto 
infeasible, since he foresees that, would he choose initially 
U , his preferences at node 1 and node 2 would make him 
continue differently and actually play strategy (U, dR if H, 
dR if T). For this reason, he settles for the less attractive 
but enforceable strategy D. Thus his suboptimal choices 
are the result of his dynamic inconsistencies in the 
following sense : a DM is dynamically consistent (DC) 
when the DM considers it optimal at every node to 
continue as planned by the original optimal strategy. 
The possibility of decomposing the SEU criterion as 
L P(ei) u(ci)= L P(Aj) [ L P(ei/Aj) u(ci)] (3) 
eicAj 
shows immediately that SEU maximizers are DC provided 
they update probabilities according to Bayes' rule. Note 
that the criterion at node j, where event Aj is known to 
obtain, takes only into account the gains on the subevents 
of Aj ; what happens outside Aj is irrelevant. 
According to a general definition, separability (SEP) 
holds when the DM's optimal strategy in any subtree does 
not depend on the rest of tree. Thus, DC and SEP hold 
true for the SEU criterion. Together DC and SEP imply 
the validity of Bellman's principle of dynamic 
programming and thus the possibility of generating an 
optimal strategy by backward induction. 
On the other hand, when applying a CEU criterion at each 
node, SEP is satisfied and DC is not. As we shall see now 
, it is also possible to conceive non-EU behavior which 
satisfies DC but not SEP and offers some guaranties from 
the normative point of view. 
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4 RESOLUTE CHOICE AND ITS 
IMPLEMENTATION 
4.1 RESOLUTE CHOICE 
The thorough analysis of dynamic choice under uncertainty 
in (McClennen 1990) resulted in his proposal of an 
alternative to SEU theory, the so-called resolute choice 
solution, which we shall introduce through our example. 
Example 1 (continued) 
The DM can always achieve an undominated strategy by 
enforcing the strategy he judges optimal at node 0 and thus 
being DC. This is strategy (U, d'B if H, d'y if T), which 
means that at node 1 he accepts to choose d'B against dR. 
Consider now the modified tree where, at node 2 d'y has 
been replaced by d'B and D(own) yields 0 whatever 
happens. The DM being ambiguity averse, it is likely that 
1/3 = TI(R) > TI((H n R) u (T n Y)) = 
TI((H n B) u (T n R)) > TI(B), 
in which case, the best strategy at node 0 is (U,dR if H, 
dR if T), Now, its enforcement requires that, at node 1, 
the DM accept to choose dR against d'B.ThiS shows that 
choice at node 1 depends on data outside the subtree 
rooted at this node. • 
Thus, a DM can depart from SEU maximization, and still 
make non-dominated choices, by being dynamically 
consistent. There is however a price to pay, which is 
giving up SEP (Machina 198 9). 
Submission of later choices to initial preference is of 
course only a special case of more general forms of 
compromise between present and future wishes. According 
to (McClennen 1990), "the theory of resolute choice is 
predicated on the notion that the single agent who is faced 
with making decisions over time can achieve a cooperative 
arrangement between his present self and his relevant 
future selves that satisfies the principle of intrapersonal 
optimality". 
There is fundamental problem with resolute choice which 
is the question of its psychological feasibility. Why 
should the Selves cooperate ? As a matter of fact, 
sophisticated choice is the noncooperative solution 
proposed by game theory : as a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium (Rasmusen 198 9 ; Karni and Safra 198 9), it 
constitutes a credible solution . .  On the other hand, it can 
be argued that, being the successive Selves of the same 
DM, the players: (i) have part of their interests in 
common; and (ii) cannot hide their intentions from one 
another, which should facilitate their cooperation. 
We shall admit that the Selves have consensus goals and 
are able to cooperate, at least to some extent. Specifically, 
we endow each Self with a choice criterion which is not 
influenced by what happens outside his subtree (thus in 
the absence of cooperation SEP would hold). 
The willingness of the Selves to cooperate shall be 
expressed either by commitments to rule out certain 
decisions or by (possibly limited) obedience to earlier 
Selves' recommendations. 
The main consensus goal we shall consider is the choice 
of an undominated strategy : a strategy in a decision tree 
is dominated when there exists another feasible strategy 
yielding a superior gain whatever happens and a strictly 
superior gain for some elementary event. 
A less demanding goal is immunity to Money Pumps : 
a DM is the victim of a Money Pump when, at some 
decision node, he accepts to pay a fee and find oneself in 
an earlier decision position again (more precisely, he gets 
to the root of a decision subtree which is identical to a 
previously faced one). Another less demanding goal is 
nonnegative price of information : information received 
before,rather than after, decision making enlarges the set of 
feasible strategies, since the DM is free to make, or not, 
his later decisions contingent on these data. Thus the DM 
should never accept to pay for not receiving information. 
Strategies involving either a Mony Pump or a negative 
price of some information are clearly instances of 
dominated strategies. 
We shall successively consider various forms of 
commitment of the Selves and examine wether or not they 
permit to achieve these consensus goal. Note that any 
amounf of cooperation makes SEP invalid, which in turn 
implies that dynamic programming will, at best, only be 
useful as an auxiliary tool. 
4.2 JUSTIFIABLE CHOICE 
Any form of cooperation ensuring the final selection of an 
undominated strategy must in particular ensure that no· 
Self ever chooses a decision which is not part of at least 
one undominated strategy. Justifiable choice is the 
particular instance of resolute choice in which each Self 
exactly makes this minimal commitment. Let us (i) see 
how it can be implemented and (ii) examine what can be 
achieved by it 
Jointly, these commitments amount to replacing the 
decision tree T by the "subtree" T0 which is composed of 
all the paths which could result from at least one 
undominated strategy. It is not easy, in general to 
construct T0. In practice, one would only generate part of 
it through a limited number of undominated strategies, 
those maximizing linear forms (expected gains) 
I, «i Ci for various sets of positive weights 
i 
(probabilities) («i) on the elementary events ei (each 
strategy being standardly determinated by dynamic 
programming, which is, of course, valid for expectations) 
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and restrict oneself to the "subtree" TI spanned by these 
strategies (and the chance moves). We call justifiable 
strategies the strategies in T0.They are indeed justifiable 
ex post , since there is always an undominated strategy 
which, for the nested sequence of true events, would have 
lead to the same sequence of decisions. Obviously, for 
different sequences of true events, the decisions resulting 
from a justifiable strategy coincide with those decisions 
resulting from another undominated strategy. Thus, even a 
justifiable strategy of TI cannot be associated with 
particular weighting systems (ai) and may well be a 
dominated stmtegy. 
In the absence of further cooperation, the strategy finally 
selected should be the sophisticated strategy in T 0 (in 
practice in TI), which can be determined by backward 
induction (dynamic programming): each Self, in turn, 
anticipates later Selves' choices and optimizes his own 
choice in T0 (commitment) according to his non-EU 
criterion. Note that the introduction of subtree T 0 has . 
allowed one to recover SEP. 
As for the rationality properties of justifiable choice, it is 
straightforward that the DM is immune to Money Pumps: 
the edge (decision) "accept to pay" cannot be part of any 
undominated strategy in T ("refuse to pay" offers the same 
opportunities plus the fee), hence this edge is not part of 
T 0 either. For similar reasons, this DM will never 
attribute a negative price to information. 
However, a justifiable strategy can be dominated as 
shown by the following example : 
Figure 2 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
2/9+ 2£ 
1+£ 
£ 
l/7+2£ 
£ 
1+£ 
Example 2 
Elementary events : ei , i = 1, ... ,8 . Et = e1ue2 ; 
E2 = e3ue4 ; E3 = esue{) ; E4 = e7ue8 ; Gt = etue3 ; 
G2 = e2ue4 ; G3 = esue7 ; G4 = e{)u e8 ; hence, 
EtuE2 = GtuG2 and E3uE4 = G3uG4 . 
Information on the events is characterized by lower 
probability II, which is a belief function with Mobius 
masses {basic probability assignment) : 
cp{EtuE2) = l/4 ; <p{E3uE4) = 3/8 ; cp{EI) = <p(E2) = l/8 ; 
cp{E3) = cp{E4) = l/16. 
Thus II(EI) = II(E2) = 118 ; II(E3) = II(E4) = 1/16 ; 
II{Etu£3) = II{Etu£4) = 3116. 
We assume that the DM updates lower probabilities by the 
generalized Bayesian rule 
II{A/B) = II(N [II(A) + 1 - II(AuBc)] , hence : 
II(EI I EtuE2) = 114 ; II(E4 I E3uE4) = l/8 ; 
II (Ell EtuE3) = 2!9 ;  II(£4 I E2uE4) = In. 
We moreover assume that the DM is a CEU maximizer, 
with U = Id and capacity II( . /B) when B is the available 
information. He is also a sophisticated DM. The decision 
tree T is shown on Figure 2. t is an arbitrarily small 
positive number. T is generated by the justifiable 
strategies, i.e., T0 = T, since the linear form defined by 
the (ai) is maximized by strategy (do, dt, d4) when a= 
(0, 114, 0, 114, 0, 114, 0), by strategy (do, d2, d3) when a 
= (114, 0, 114, 0, 0, 114, 0, 114), by strategy (o0, 02. 04) 
when <Xi = 118 for all i, and by strategy (00, OJ, 03) 
when a= (0, 118 , 0, 7/8 , 15/16, 0, 1116, 0). 
The sophisticated strategy is (d0, dt, d3), which is 
dominated by (do, d2, d4). • 
Thus a stronger form of cooperation between the Selves is 
required to guarantee the selection of an undominated 
strategy. 
4.3 A COOPERATIVE DECISION PROCESS 
4.3.1 Unlimited cooperation 
The progressive construction of an undominated strategy 
by a recursive procedure can be easily devised. 
Firstly, as in subsection 4.2, a series of weighting 
systems (ai), which can be interpreted as probabilities on 
the elementary events (ei), are generated. For every 
system (ai), a strategy maximizing the corresponding 
linear form in the decision tree T is determined (by 
dynamic programming). This strategy is undominated in 
T. We call it the (ai)- strategy. These strategies (together 
with the chance moves) span a "subtree" Tt of T. 
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_.---S, 
Figure 3 
We use Figure 3, where a portion of subtree TI is 
represented, to explain the principle of the procedure, 
which rolls back TI. 
The recurrence assumption is that undominated 
substrategies Sk have been tentatively selected at nodes k 
= I, ... ,5, and that each of them is part of (at least) one of 
the strategies spanning TI and thus is associated with 
some weighting system (<Xki). For instance SI and (U, 
S 1 if AI. S'2 if A2) might be (a l i)-substrategies (i.e., 
substrategies of (<Xl i)-strategies), whereas S2 and (U, S'I 
if AI, S2 if A2) might be (<X2i)-substrategies, and S3 
and (D, S3 if A3, S'4 if A4, S'5 if As) might be 
(<X3i)-substrategies, etc ... By selecting at node 0 either (U, 
S I  if AI, S'2 if A2 ) or one of the other (<X k i ) ­
substrategies, one always selects an undominated (ai)­
substrategy. It becomes then possible to select the best of 
them according to the DM's real criterion at node 0. 
Thus we have moved one step back in TI. Clearly, this 
procedure finally selects an undominated strategy at the 
root. 
Although limited to a small number of substrategies, 
optimizations at the decision nodes take into account the 
real preferences of the Selves, so that the strategy finally 
select must reflect them to some extent. 
Yet it seems unrealistic to admit that the Selves are ready 
to switch from a given decision to any other less attractive 
decision for ensuring an undominated choice : the 
willingness to cooperate might have limits. 
4.3.2 Limited cooperation 
The rather vague concept of willingness to cooperate can 
be given an operational meaning when the Selves have the 
same cardinal criterion such as CEU with the same utility 
u(.). One can for instance assume that every Self is 
willing to accept a substrategy with CEU value less by Eo 
than the best substrategy that he knows to be enforceable 
(at that point of the recursive process). 
The preceding procedure can be easily amended to take into 
account limited willingness to cooperate at Eo-level. The 
new (and realistic) feature is that it can now fail, if each of 
the undominated substrategies generated is rejected by at 
least one Self. 
A limited cooperation procedure might work as follows 
(on Figure 3). At node I, SI is still the tentative 
substrategy, whereas S'I and the other dotted line 
substrategies are now those substrategies which are known 
to be acceptable by the node I Self and all his successors 
(this means that VI(S'I) � VI(SI) - Eo , etc ... ). 
Now a substrategy is no longer available at node 0 when 
one of its branches is missing. For instance, if (U, SI if 
AI. S"2 if A2) is the only (ai)-substrategy containing SI 
and S"2 is not acceptable at node 2, then "SI if AI" 
cannot be considered at node 0. Thus, after some more 
chopping off has taken place, and, at each node k, Sk has 
been replaced by the best remaining substrategy for 
criterion Vk , the procedure can continue exactly as in the 
unlimited case. 
It may of course happen that there does not remain any 
available substrategy at node 0, in which case Eo­
cooperation should be considered to have failed. 
5 CONCLUSION 
Thus, the fact that the resolute choice approach must give 
up to separability does not necessarily prevent the 
existence .of operational ways of constructing a resolute 
choice solution. The procedures we have proposed are not 
the only conceivable ones, and it remains to examine 
whether or not the solutions they favour reflect more 
likely compromises between the different selves than 
alternativeprocedures. 
Extensions of the procedures to the construction of 
strategies which satisfy other types of non-dominance 
requirements, such as w.r.t. stochastic dominance under 
risk, only seem to require a suitable adaptation of the 
strategy generating mecanism. 
We hope that the above considerations demonstrate that 
decision aiding has no theoretical nor practical ground to 
limit itself to SEU theory. 
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